Failure Detectors: definition, algorithms, and applications

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Roadmap



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- Application: a Consensus Algorithm
- The Model
- The Algorithm
- The Proof
- Implementation of a Failure Detector
 - $\diamond P$
 - The Model
 - The Algorithm
 - The Proof



References

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Introduction

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Outline of the FLP's Impossibility [3]

The impossibility of the consensus comes from the fact that correct processes cannot differentiate slow processes from crashed ones.

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The impossibility of the consensus comes from the fact that correct processes cannot differentiate slow processes from crashed ones.

Using synchrony assumptions, processes can obtain information about crashes.

Then, this information enables solving problems, including consensus.

The Failure Detector Approach [1]

In a software engineering spirit:

- separate the necessary knowledge on crashes to solve the problem (the definition of the failure detector)
- from the way it can be obtained¹ (the implementation of the failure detector)

¹ In particular, the necessary assumptions on the system.

²A lesson we be dedicated to this aspect.

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Advantages

- Separation of concerns: modularity and simplicity
- Possibility to compare and to have a necessary and sufficient assumption (the minimum failure detector to solve a problem)²

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(Distributed) Failure Detector: an Oracle

Each process *p* can access a local failure detector module (an oracle function) denoted by \mathcal{D}_p .

 $^{^3\}textit{N.b.},$ some failure detectors, such as Ω or $\Sigma,$ do not return a list of suspected processes.

(Distributed) Failure Detector: an Oracle

Each process *p* can access a local failure detector module (an oracle function) denoted by \mathcal{D}_p .

Each module watches a subset of system processes (usually the whole set of processes), and returns information about crashed: usually a set of suspected processes.³

Precisely, the identifiers of processes that are suspected of being crashed.

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Precisely, the identifiers of processes that are suspected of being crashed.

Unless otherwise mentioned, we will always assume that

each local failure detector module watches <u>all processes</u> and returns a list of suspected processes.

 $^{^{3}}$ *N.b.*, some failure detectors, such as Ω or Σ , do not return a list of suspected processes.

Unreliable Failure Detectors

Each local module can make mistakes:

- by wrongly suspecting correct processes
- by missing some crashed processes

Failure Detector Classes

The classes of failure detectors are distinguished by two important properties:

Completeness: restrict the ability of the failure detector module to detect crashes

Accuracy: qualify the possibility of the failure detector module to wrongly suspect correct processes

Completeness: Examples

Strong Completeness: Every faulty process is eventually permanently suspected by every correct process.

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Strong Completeness: Every faulty process is eventually permanently suspected by every correct process.

Weak Completeness: Every faulty process is eventually permanently suspected by some correct process.

Accuracy: Examples

Strong accuracy: no process is suspected (by any alive process⁴) before it crashes.

⁴An alive process is either a correct process or a faulty process that has not crashed yet.

⁵As explained in [1], we can use <u>correct</u> instead of <u>alive</u> with loss of generality for eventual strong/weak accuracy.

Accuracy: Examples

Strong accuracy: no process is suspected (by any alive process⁴) before it crashes.

Weak accuracy: some correct process is never suspected (by any alive process).

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Eventual strong accuracy: there is a time after which no correct process is suspected by any correct process.⁵

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Eventual strong accuracy: there is a time after which no correct process is suspected by any correct process.⁵

Eventual weak accuracy: there is a time after which some correct process is never suspected by any correct process.

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Some Classes of Failure Detectors

Completeness	Accuracy			
	Strong	Weak	Eventually Strong	Eventually Weak
Strong	Perfect	Strong	Eventually Perfect	Eventually Strong
	P	S	$\diamond \mathscr{P}$	\$S
Weak	Quasi-perfect	Weak	Eventually Quasi-perfect	Eventually Weak
	Q	${\mathcal W}$		$\diamond \mathcal{W}$

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Roadmap



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Failure Detector \mathcal{S}

We now study a consensus algorithm⁶ that uses S:

Strong Completeness: Every faulty process is eventually permanently suspected by every correct process.

Weak accuracy: some correct process is never suspected (by any alive process).

⁶This algorithm is inspired for one of Chandra and Toueg [2].

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- Failure detector S: local module S_p for each process p
- Asynchronous processes
- Asynchronous reliable links (not necessarily FIFO)
- Any process p can broadcast a message to all processes (p included!)
- No assumption on the number of crashes!

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Principles

3 Phases:

- Phase 1: n-1 asynchronous rounds where proposed values are broadcast and relayed.
- Phase 2: 1 asynchronous round where all alive processes agree on the value of a vector *V* based on proposed values.

Phase 3: each alive process decides according to the vector V.

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Constants & Variables

- Processes are identified: a process and its identifier are used equivalently
- V: set of processes
- n: number of processes
- *v_p*: a boolean (read-only) input, the value proposed by process *p*
- $d_p \in \{\perp, 0, 1\}$: the decision variable
- $r_{p} \in \mathbb{N}$: the round number of process p
- $\Delta_{\rho}[], V_{\rho}[]$: vectors indexed on the process IDs. $\rightarrow \forall q \in V, V_{\rho}[q] \in \{0, 1, \bot\} \text{ and } \Delta_{\rho}[q] \in \{0, 1, \bot\}$

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Algorithm of Chandra and Toueg

1: $d_p \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ 5: For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do 6: broadcast (r_p, Δ_p, p) to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_{D}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{a}[k]$ 13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done **17:** broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from every process $q \in V \setminus \mathcal{S}_p$ **19:** Let *lastmsqs*_n be the set of received $\langle V_n \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done **23:** $d_n \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_n

/* Phase 1 */

/* Phase 2 */

/* Phase 3 */

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Validity

Remark 1

At the end of Round $r \ge 1$, $\Delta_p[q] \ne \bot$ IFF $p \ne q$, $\Delta_p[q]$ is the value proposed by q, and p has received this value for the first time during Round r.

From Remark 1 and owing the fact that $V_{\rho}[p] = v_{\rho}$ after the initialization (Lines 1-4), we can deduce the following lemma by definition of the algorithm:

Lemma 1

For every two processes p and q, after the initialization (Lines 1-4) and while p is not crashed, $V_p[q]$ is either v_q or \perp .

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do /* Phase 1 *,
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let *lastmsgsp* be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

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Termination

Lemma 2

Every correct process eventually executes Line 23.

Proof.

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do /* Phase 1 */
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
16: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let *lastmsgs*_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

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Lemma 2

Every correct process eventually executes Line 23.

Proof.

The only way to prevent a correct process p from reaching Line 23 is to block it forever on Line 7 or 18 in some round r.

1:
$$d_{\rho} \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_{\rho} \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_{\rho}[\rho] \leftarrow v_{\rho}$
4: $\Delta_{\rho} \leftarrow V_{\rho}$
5: For all r_{ρ} from 1 to $n-1$ do /* Phase 1 */
6: broadcast $\langle r_{\rho}, \Delta_{\rho}, \rho \rangle$ to V (ρ included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_{\rho}, \Delta_{q}, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_{\rho}$
8: let $R_{\rho}[r_{\rho}]$ be the set of received $\langle r_{\rho}, \Delta_{q}, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_{\rho} \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_{\rho}[k] = \bot \wedge (\exists (r_{\rho}, \Delta_{q}, q) \in R_{\rho}[r_{\rho}], \Delta_{q}[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_{\rho}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$
13: $\Delta_{\rho}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
16: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_{\rho} \rangle$ to V (ρ included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_{q} \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_{\rho}$
19: Let *lastmsgs*_{\rho} be the set of received $\langle V_{q} \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_{q} \in lastmsgs_{\rho}, V_{q}[k] = \bot$ then $V_{\rho}[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_{\rho} \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_{ρ} /* Phase 3 */

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Lemma 2

Every correct process eventually executes Line 23.

Proof.

The only way to prevent a correct process p from reaching Line 23 is to block it forever on Line 7 or 18 in some round r.

Let *Faulty* \subseteq *V* be the set of faulty processes. Let *Correct* \subseteq *V* be the set of correct processes.

By definition, $V = Faulty \cup Correct$.

By strong completeness, eventually $V \setminus S_p \subseteq Correct$ forever

1: $d_n \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_{\rho}, \Delta_{q}, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_{\rho}$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_{D} \leftarrow [\bot, \dots, \bot]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{q}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{q}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_{p}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 19: Let *lastmsgs*_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_n \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_n /* Phase 3 */

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We now consider the cases of Line 7 and 18 separately.

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Introduction Definition Application: a Consensus Algorithm The Proof References Termination Case 1: Line 7 1: $d_p \leftarrow \perp$ By induction on $r: \forall p \in Correct, p$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$ completes every Round $r \in [1..n-1]$. 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ 5: For all r_n from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_n, \Delta_n, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_n$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_{p}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done **17:** broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 19: Let *lastmsgs*_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */ Cournier & Devismes Failure Detectors April 26, 2023 21/49

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Case 1: Line 7

By induction on $r: \forall p \in Correct, p$ completes every Round $r \in [1..n-1]$.

r = 1: $\forall q \in Correct$, q completes Line 6 during Round 1.

By link reliability, $\forall p \in Correct, p$ eventually receives $\langle 1, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from every $q \in Correct$ in Round 1.

Since eventually $V \setminus S_p \subseteq Correct$ forever, *p* completes Round 1.

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By link reliability, $\forall p \in Correct, p$ eventually receives $\langle 1, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from every $q \in Correct$ in Round 1.

Since eventually $V \setminus S_p \subseteq Correct$ forever, *p* completes Round 1.

r > 1: By induction hypothesis, $\forall q \in Correct, q \text{ completes Round } r - 1$, so q completes Line 6 during Round r.

By link reliability, $\forall p \in Correct, p$ eventually receives $\langle r, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from every $q \in Correct$ in Round *r*.

Since eventually $V \setminus S_p \subseteq Correct$ forever, $\forall p \in Correct, p \text{ completes Round } r.$

1: $d_n \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_n \leftarrow [\bot, \dots, \bot]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_n \leftarrow V_n$ 5: For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_n, \Delta_n, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_n$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_{p}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 19: Let *lastmsas*_n be the set of received $\langle V_{\alpha} \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

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Case 2: Line 18

From the previous induction, $\forall p \in Correct$, p completes Phase 1.

So, $\forall p \in Correct$, p completes Line 17.

By link reliability, $\forall p \in Correct, p$ eventually receives $\langle V_a \rangle$ from every $q \in Correct.$

Since eventually $V \setminus S_p \subseteq Correct$ forever, $\forall p \in Correct, p \text{ completes Line18}.$

1: $d_D \leftarrow \bot$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_D \leftarrow V_D$ For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_n, \Delta_n, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_n$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_{\mathcal{D}} \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_{\alpha} \rangle$ from $\alpha \in V \setminus S_{\alpha}$ **19:** Let *lastmsasp* be the set of received $\langle V_{\alpha} \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_n \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_n /* Phase 3 */ April 26, 2023 22/49

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Notations

- By weak accuracy: there is a correct process *c* which is never suspected.
- Let Π_1 be the set of processes that terminate the n-1 rounds of Phase 1.
- Let Π₂ be the set of processes that terminate Phase 2.

By definition, $\Pi_2 \subseteq \Pi_1$.

• We note $V_p \leq V_q$ IFF $\forall k$, either $V_p[k] = V_q[k]$ or $V_p[k] = \bot$.
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Messages from c

Lemma 3

During Round *r*, with $1 \le r \le n-1$, every process of Π_1 receives (r, Δ_c, c) from *c*, *i.e.*, $(r, \Delta_c, c) \in R_p[c]$.

Proof. Since $p \in \Pi_1$, *p* terminates all rounds of Phase 1.

At each round, *p* waits and receives a $\langle r, \Delta_c, c \rangle$ message from *c* since $c \notin S_p$ forever.

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do /* Phase 1 *
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let $Astmag_p$ be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmag_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Learning Values

Lemma 4

 $\forall p \in \Pi_1, V_c \leq V_p$ at the end of Phase 1.

Proof.

Assume that $V_c[q] \neq \perp$ at the end of Phase 1 for some process q.

By Lemma 1, $V_c[q] = v_q$.

Let $p \in \Pi_1$. We now show that $V_p[q] = v_q$ at the end of Phase 1.

The case p = c is trivial. So, we now assume that $p \neq c$.

Let *r* be the first round where *c* receives v_q (if c = q, we let r = 0 and assume the end of Round 0 is Line 4)

 $\Delta_c[q] = v_q$ at the end of Round *r*.

Two cases: r < n-1 and r = n-1

1: $d_n \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ 5: For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_{D}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{a}[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done **17:** broadcast $\langle V_n \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_{\alpha} \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_{\alpha}$ **19:** Let *lastmsqs*_n be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_a \in lastmsqs_p$, $V_a[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_n \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

Definition Application: a Consensus Algorithm References

The Proof

Learning Values

Case 1: *r* < *n*−1

During Round $r+1 \le n-1$, c relays v_a by broadcasting $\langle r+1,\Delta_c,c\rangle$ with $\Delta_c[q] = v_q.$

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n - 1$ do /* Phase 1 *
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
16: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let lastmsgs_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Learning Values

Case 1: *r* < *n*−1

During Round $r + 1 \le n - 1$, c relays v_q by broadcasting $\langle r + 1, \Delta_c, c \rangle$ with $\Delta_c[q] = v_q$.

By Lemma 3, *p* receives $\langle r+1, \Delta_c, c \rangle$ during Round r+1.

1: $d_D \leftarrow \bot$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_n, \Delta_n, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_n, \Delta_n, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_n$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_{\alpha} \rangle$ from $\alpha \in V \setminus S_{\alpha}$ **19:** Let *lastmsasp* be the set of received $\langle V_{\alpha} \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_n \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_n /* Phase 3 */ April 26, 2023 26/49

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Learning Values

Case 1: *r* < *n*−1

During Round $r + 1 \le n - 1$, c relays v_q by broadcasting $\langle r + 1, \Delta_c, c \rangle$ with $\Delta_c[q] = v_q$.

By Lemma 3, *p* receives $\langle r+1, \Delta_c, c \rangle$ during Round r+1.

From the code of the algorithm, $V_p[q] = v_q$ at the end of round r + 1.

1:	$d_{\mathbf{r}} \leftarrow 1$	
2:	$V_{p} \leftarrow [1]$	
3	$V_{r}[n] \leftarrow v_{r}$	
<u>م</u> .	$\rho[\rho] < \rho$	
5.	$\Delta p \leftarrow v_p$	/* Phase 1 */
6·	$p_{p} = 100 \text{ m}^{-1} \text{ m}^{m$	/ 111436 1 /
7.	broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)	
/. 0.	wait to receive (r_p, Δ_q, q) from $q \in V \setminus S_p$	
8:	let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$	
9:	$\Delta_{\rho} \leftarrow [\perp, \dots, \perp]$	
10:	For all $k \in V$ do	
11:	If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq$	\perp) then
12:	$V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$	
13:	$\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$	
14:	End If	
15:	Done	
1 <u>6</u> :	Done	
17:	broadcast $\langle V_{m{ ho}} angle$ to V ($m{ ho}$ included)	/* Phase 2 */
18:	wait to receive $\langle V_{m{q}} angle$ from $m{q} \in m{V} \setminus \mathcal{S}_{m{ ho}}$	
19:	Let $lastmsgs_p$ be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$	
20:	For all $k \in V$ do	
21:	If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$	
22:	Done	
23:	$d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p	/* Phase 3 */
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The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Learning Values

Case 2: r = n - 1

Since *c* receives v_q for the first time during Round n-1 and every process relays v_q at most once:

 v_q has been relayed by n-1 distinct different from *c* before reaching *c*.

p necessarily belongs to this set of processes.

1:	$d_p \leftarrow \perp$	
2:	$V_p \leftarrow [\perp,, \perp]$	
3:	$V_{\rho}[\rho] \leftarrow v_{\rho}$	
4:	$\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$	
5:	For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do	/* Phase 1 */
6:	broadcast $\langle r_{p}, \Delta_{p}, p angle$ to V (p included)	
7:	wait to receive $\langle r_{m{ ho}}, \Delta_{m{q}}, m{q} angle$ from $m{q} \in V \setminus \mathcal{S}_{m{ ho}}$	
8:	let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$	
9:	$\Delta_{ ho} \leftarrow [\perp, \dots, \perp]$	
10:	For all $k \in V$ do	
11:	If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq 1$	\perp) then
12:	$V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$	
13:	$\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$	
14:	End If	
15:	Done	
1 <u>6</u> :	Done	
17:	broadcast $\langle V_{m{ ho}} angle$ to V ($m{ ho}$ included)	/* Phase 2 */
18:	wait to receive $\langle V_{m{q}} angle$ from $m{q}\in m{V}ackslash \mathcal{S}_{m{ ho}}$	
19:	Let $lastmsgs_p$ be the set of received $\langle V_q angle$	
20:	For all $k \in V$ do	
21:	If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$	
22:	Done	
23:	$d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p	/* Phase 3 */
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The Proof

Learning Values

Case 2: r = n - 1

Since *c* receives v_q for the first time during Round n-1 and every process relays v_a at most once:

 v_a has been relayed by n-1 distinct different from c before reaching c.

p necessarily belongs to this set of processes.

Now, $V_p[q] = v_q$ right before relaying v_q , so $V_p[q] = v_q$ at the end of Phase 1.

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do /* Phase 1 $?$
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: if $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
16: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 $?$
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let *lastmsgsp* be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 $?$ /
24: Detectors

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (1/3)

Lemma 5

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_c = V_p$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof. Let $p \in \Pi_2$. Let q be a process. We should show that $V_p[q] = V_c[q]$ at the end of Phase 2.

By Lemma 1, we have the following two cases:

• $V_c[q] = v_q$ at the end of Phase 1.

• $V_c[q] = \perp$ at the end of Phase 1.

1:	$d_p \leftarrow \perp$	
2:	$V_p \leftarrow [\perp, \dots, \perp]$	
3:	$V_{\rho}[\rho] \leftarrow v_{\rho}$	
4:	$\Delta_{p} \leftarrow V_{p}$	
5:	For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do	/* Phase 1 */
6:	broadcast $\langle r_{\! p}, \Delta_{\! p}, p angle$ to V (p included)	
7:	wait to receive $\langle r_{ ho}, \Delta_{m{q}}, m{q} angle$ from $m{q} \in V \setminus \mathcal{S}_{m{p}}$	
8:	let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$	
9:	$\Delta_{ ho} \leftarrow [\perp, \dots, \perp]$	
10:	For all $k \in V$ do	
11:	If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq$	\perp) then
12:	$V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$	
13:	$\Delta_{\rho}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$	
14:	End If	
15:	Done	
16:	Done	
17:	broadcast $\langle V_{m{ ho}} angle$ to V ($m{ ho}$ included)	/* Phase 2 */
18:	wait to receive $\langle V_{m{q}} angle$ from $m{q} \in m{V} \setminus \mathcal{S}_{m{p}}$	
19:	Let $lastmsgs_p$ be the set of received $\langle V_q angle$	
20:	For all $k \in V$ do	
21:	If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$	
22:	Done	
23:	$d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p	/* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (1/3)

Lemma 5

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_c = V_p$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof. Let $p \in \Pi_2$. Let q be a process. We should show that $V_p[q] = V_c[q]$ at the end of Phase 2.

By Lemma 1, we have the following two cases:

• $V_c[q] = v_q$ at the end of Phase 1.

By Lemma 4, $\forall p' \in \Pi_1$ (*p* and *c* included), $V_{p'}[q] = v_q$ at the end of Phase 1.

Thus, for all vectors V sent during Phase 2, we have $V[q] = v_q$.

Hence, $V_p[q]$ and $V_c[q]$ remain equal to v_q during Phase 2.

• $V_c[q] = \perp$ at the end of Phase 1.

1: $d_p \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ 5: For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast (r_p, Δ_p, p) to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ **19:** Let *lastmsgs*_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (1/3)

Lemma 5

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_c = V_p$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof. Let $p \in \Pi_2$. Let q be a process. We should show that $V_p[q] = V_c[q]$ at the end of Phase 2.

By Lemma 1, we have the following two cases:

• $V_c[q] = v_q$ at the end of Phase 1.

By Lemma 4, $\forall p' \in \Pi_1$ (*p* and *c* included), $V_{p'}[q] = v_q$ at the end of Phase 1.

Thus, for all vectors V sent during Phase 2, we have $V[q] = v_q$.

Hence, $V_p[q]$ and $V_c[q]$ remain equal to v_q during Phase 2.

$V_c[q] = \perp$ at the end of Phase 1.

Since $c \notin S_p$ forever, p waits and receives V_c during Phase 2.

Since $V_c[q] = \perp$, p sets $V_p[q]$ to \perp during Phase 2.

1: $d_p \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ 5: For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast (r_p, Δ_p, p) to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ **19:** Let *lastmsgs*_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_n[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (2/3)

Lemma 6

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_p[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof.

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (2/3)

Lemma 6

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_p[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof. From the code of the algorithm (Line 3), we know that $V_c[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 1.

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n - 1$ do /* Phase 1 */
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let $Astrangs_p$ be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in Iastrangs_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

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The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (2/3)

Lemma 6

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_p[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof. From the code of the algorithm (Line 3), we know that $V_c[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 1.

By Lemma 4, $\forall q \in \Pi_1$, $V_q[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 1.

1: $d_n \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ 5: For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast (r_p, Δ_p, p) to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_a[k]$ 13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ **19:** Let *lastmsqs_n* be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_{\alpha} \in lastmsgs_{\rho}, V_{\alpha}[k] = \perp$ then $V_{\rho}[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (2/3)

Lemma 6

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_p[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof. From the code of the algorithm (Line 3), we know that $V_c[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 1.

By Lemma 4, $\forall q \in \Pi_1$, $V_q[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 1.

Thus, no process sends a vector V such that $V[c] = \perp$ during Phase 2.

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do /* Phase 1 */
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, \rho \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let *lastmsgsp* be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

П

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (2/3)

Lemma 6

 $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_p[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 2.

Proof. From the code of the algorithm (Line 3), we know that $V_c[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 1.

By Lemma 4, $\forall q \in \Pi_1$, $V_q[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 1.

Thus, no process sends a vector V such that $V[c] = \perp$ during Phase 2.

Hence, from the code of the algorithm, we can deduce that $\forall p \in \Pi_2, V_p[c] = v_c$ at the end of Phase 2.

1:
$$d_p \leftarrow \bot$$

2: $V_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$
4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$
5: For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do /* Phase 1 *
6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)
7: wait to receive $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$
9: $\Delta_p \leftarrow [\bot, ..., \bot]$
10: For all $k \in V$ do
11: If $V_p[k] = \bot \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq \bot)$ then
12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$
14: End If
15: Done
16: Done
17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */
18: wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$
19: Let *lastmsgs* be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$
20: For all $k \in V$ do
21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \bot$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \bot$
22: Done
23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \bot value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Decision (3/3)

Corollary 1

No two processes decide differently.

Proof. By Lemma 6, all processes that execute Phase 3 take a well-defined decision.

By Lemma 5, all processes that execute Phase 3 have the same vector.

So, they take the same decision.

1: $d_n \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_p \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast (r_p, Δ_p, p) to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_n, \Delta_n, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_n$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$ 13: $\Delta_n[k] \leftarrow \Delta_n[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ **19:** Let *lastmsgs*_n be the set of received $\langle V_n \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_{\alpha} \in lastmsas_{n}, V_{\alpha}[k] = \perp$ then $V_{\alpha}[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done **23:** $d_n \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_n /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Result

Theorem 1

The algorithm of Chandra and Toueg solves the consensus in an asynchronous system enriched with a failure detector S.

Proof.

1:	$d_{2} \leftarrow 1$	
2:	$V_{\rm p} \leftarrow [\perp, \dots, \perp]$	
3:	$V_0[p] \leftarrow v_0$	
4:	$\Delta_{0} \leftarrow V_{0}$	
5:	For all r_p from 1 to $n-1$ do	/* Phase 1 */
6:	broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included)	
7:	wait to receive $\langle r_{ ho}, \Delta_{q}, q angle$ from $q \in V \setminus \mathcal{S}_{ ho}$	
8:	let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q angle$	
9:	$\Delta_{p} \leftarrow [\perp, \dots, \perp]$	
10:	For all $k \in V$ do	
11:	If $V_p[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_p, \Delta_q, q) \in R_p[r_p], \Delta_q[k] \neq$	\perp) then
12:	$V_{\mathcal{P}}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$	
13:	$\Delta_{ ho}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{q}[k]$	
14:	End If	
15:	Done	
17:	broadcast $\langle V_n \rangle$ to V (p included)	/* Phase 2 */
18:	wait to receive $\langle V_{q} \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_{p}$	
19:	Let <i>lastmsgs</i> _p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$	
20:	For all $k \in V$ do	
21:	If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$	
22:	Done	
23:	$d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p	/* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Result

Theorem 1

The algorithm of Chandra and Toueg solves the consensus in an asynchronous system enriched with a failure detector S.

Proof.

 Integrity: from the code of the algorithm, Phase 3 is executed only once.

1: $d_n \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_n \leftarrow [\bot, \dots, \bot]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_{\rho}, \Delta_{\rho}, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_{\rho}$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_{n}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{n}[k]$ 13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ **19:** Let *lastmsgs*_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done **23:** $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Result

Theorem 1

The algorithm of Chandra and Toueg solves the consensus in an asynchronous system enriched with a failure detector S.

Proof.

- Integrity: from the code of the algorithm, Phase 3 is executed only once.
- Termination: Lemma 2.
- Agreement: Corollary 1.
- Validity: Lemma 1 and Line 23.

1: $d_n \leftarrow \perp$ 2: $V_n \leftarrow [\bot, \dots, \bot]$ 3: $V_p[p] \leftarrow v_p$ 4: $\Delta_p \leftarrow V_p$ For all r_p from 1 to n-1 do /* Phase 1 */ 6: broadcast $\langle r_p, \Delta_p, p \rangle$ to V (p included) 7: wait to receive $\langle r_{\rho}, \Delta_{\rho}, q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_{\rho}$ 8: let $R_p[r_p]$ be the set of received $\langle r_p, \Delta_q, q \rangle$ 9: $\Delta_n \leftarrow [\perp, \ldots, \perp]$ 10: For all $k \in V$ do 11: If $V_{\mathcal{D}}[k] = \perp \land (\exists (r_{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}, q) \in R_{\mathcal{D}}[r_{\mathcal{D}}], \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}[k] \neq \perp)$ then 12: $V_{n}[k] \leftarrow \Delta_{n}[k]$ 13: $\Delta_p[k] \leftarrow \Delta_q[k]$ 14: End If 15: Done 16: Done 17: broadcast $\langle V_p \rangle$ to V (p included) /* Phase 2 */ **18:** wait to receive $\langle V_q \rangle$ from $q \in V \setminus S_p$ 19: Let *lastmsgs*_p be the set of received $\langle V_q \rangle$ 20: For all $k \in V$ do 21: If $\exists V_q \in lastmsgs_p, V_q[k] = \perp$ then $V_p[k] \leftarrow \perp$ 22: Done 23: $d_p \leftarrow x$ where x is the first non- \perp value in V_p /* Phase 3 */

⊘₽ Гhe Model Гhe Algorithm Гhe Proof

Roadmap



- 2 Definition
- 3 Application: a Consensus Algorithm
 - The Model
 - The Algorithm
 - The Proof

Implementation of a Failure Detector

- $\diamond P$
- The Model
- The Algorithm
- The Proof



A Simple Example: $\diamond P$

Every failure detector of the class $\diamond P$ satisfies both strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy:

Strong Completeness: Every faulty process is eventually permanently suspected by every correct process.

Eventual strong accuracy: there is a time after which no correct process is suspected by any correct process.

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

System Assumptions

Given a failure detector of class $\diamond \mathcal{P}$, consensus can be solved in an asynchronous crash-prone system with reliable links where a majority of processes is correct.⁷

 $^{^{7}}$ In these settings, consensus can be even solved with a weaker failure detector (Ω). This fact will be established in the next lesson.

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

System Assumptions

Given a failure detector of class $\diamond \mathcal{P}$, consensus can be solved in an asynchronous crash-prone system with reliable links where a majority of processes is correct.⁷

The FLP implies that partial synchrony assumptions are required to implement such a failure detector!

⁷ In these settings, consensus can be even solved with a weaker failure detector (Ω). This fact will be established in the next lesson.

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System Assumptions

The Partially Synchronous System $S_{\diamond b}$ (1/2)

Complete Network Topology

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

System Assumptions

The Partially Synchronous System $S_{\diamond b}$ (1/2)

- Complete Network Topology
- Process failures: only crashes!

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

System Assumptions

The Partially Synchronous System $S_{\diamond b}$ (1/2)

- Complete Network Topology
- Process failures: only crashes!
- Correct processes are eventually synchronous: for every correct process *p*, there exists a time *t_p* (a priori unknown by all processes) from which *p* executes each of its instructions in a time belonging to [α_p..β_p] with 0 < α_p ≤ β_p.

 α_p and β_p are **a priori unknown**, for every process *p*.

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

System Assumptions The Partially Synchronous System Soch (2/2)

 There exists at least one eventual bi-source <>b (a priori unknown by processes): all its outgoing and incoming links are eventually reliable and synchronous, *i.e.*,

there exists a time $t_{\diamond b}$ from which every message sent to or from $\diamond b$ is delivered within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units.

 $\diamond b$, $t_{\diamond b}$, and $\delta_{\diamond b}$ are **a priori unknown** (even by $\diamond b$!)

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

System Assumptions The Partially Synchronous System Soch (2/2)

 There exists at least one eventual bi-source <>b (a priori unknown by processes): all its outgoing and incoming links are eventually reliable and synchronous, *i.e.*,

there exists a time $t_{\diamond b}$ from which every message sent to or from $\diamond b$ is delivered within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units.

 $\diamond b$, $t_{\diamond b}$, and $\delta_{\diamond b}$ are **a priori unknown** (even by $\diamond b$!)

Every other link is arbitrary slow and lossy.

Recall that every message is delivered or lost within finite time.

◇£ The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Principles

 Each process regularly broadcasts ALIVE messages tagged with its ID

Each message is relayed once.

This way, $\diamond b$ acts as a hub: eventually messages tagged with IDs of correct processes are delivered within bounded time.

◇£ The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Principles

 Each process regularly broadcasts ALIVE messages tagged with its ID

Each message is relayed once.

This way, $\diamond b$ acts as a hub: eventually messages tagged with IDs of correct processes are delivered within bounded time.

2 Each process maintains a timer for each other process.

On Time Out: the watched process is suspected.

If later, the process receives a message tagged with the ID of some suspected process, it stops suspecting it and increases the waiting time of the associated timer.

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Constants & Variables

- Processes are identified: a process and its identifier are used equivalently
- ALIVE: message type
- V: set of processes
- $k \in \mathbb{N}^*$: constant
- *Timer*_p[], *ElapseTime*_p[]: arrays of integer indexed on the process IDs, except p.
- Alive_p, Suspected_p: sets of identifiers
 (Suspected_p is the algorithm output)

◇P The Model The Algorithm The Proof

Algorithm EP

Algorithm EP for each process p, output: Suspected_p

```
1: Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
         While true do
  4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
              broadcast (ALIVE, p, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
              For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
                   If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                       If r \neq p then
                             If ElapseTime_p[r] \le 0 then Time_p[r] + +
  9:
                             ElapseTime_p[r] \leftarrow Timer_p[r]
10:
                            Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                             If r = q then broadcast \langle ALIVE, r, p \rangle to V \setminus \{p\}
12:
13:
14:
15:
                        End If
                  End If
              Done
              For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                  If ElapseTime<sub>n</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                        Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \ {q}
18:
                  else
19:
                        ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] - -
20:
21:
                   End If
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_p
23: Done
```

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Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (1/3)

Recall that the wildcard "_" designates any value.

Lemma 1

Each correct process *p* eventually no more receives $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ where *q* is a faulty process.

Proof.

```
1: Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
         While true do
   4:
              broadcast (ALIVE, p, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
   5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
  6:
7:
8:
                  If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                       If r \neq p then
                           If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[r] \leq 0 then Time<sub>p</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                           ElapseTime_p[r] \leftarrow Timer_p[r]
10:
                           Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                           If r = q then broadcast (ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
 12:
                       End If
 13:
                  End If
14:
              Done
15:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                  If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                       Alive_{D} \leftarrow Alive_{D} \setminus \{q\}
18:
                  else
19:
                       ElapseTimen[q] --
20:
                  End If
21:
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_n
23: Done
```

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Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (1/3)

Recall that the wildcard "_" designates any value.

Lemma 1

Each correct process p eventually no more receives $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ where q is a faulty process.

Proof. *q* broadcasts finitely many $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ messages before crashing.

```
1: Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
   3:
         While true do
   4:
              broadcast (ALIVE, p, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
   5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
  6:
7:
8:
                  If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                       If r \neq p then
                           If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[r] \leq 0 then Time<sub>p</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                           ElapseTime_p[r] \leftarrow Timer_p[r]
10:
                           Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                           If r = q then broadcast (ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
 12:
                       End If
 13:
                  End If
14:
              Done
15:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                  If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                       Alive_{D} \leftarrow Alive_{D} \setminus \{q\}
18:
                  else
19:
                       ElapseTimen[q] --
20:
                  End If
21:
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_n
23: Done
```

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Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (1/3)

Recall that the wildcard "_" designates any value.

Lemma 1

Each correct process *p* eventually no more receives $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ where *q* is a faulty process.

Proof. *q* broadcasts finitely many $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ messages before crashing.

Now, each $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ message is relayed at most once by every other processes.

```
1: Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
         While true do
   4:
              broadcast (ALIVE, p, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
   5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
  6:
7:
8:
                  If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                       If r \neq p then
                           If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[r] \leq 0 then Time<sub>p</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                           ElapseTime_p[r] \leftarrow Timer_p[r]
10:
                           Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                           If r = q then broadcast(ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
 12:
                       End If
 13:
                  End If
14:
              Done
15:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                  If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                       Alive_p \leftarrow Alive_p \setminus \{q\}
18:
                  else
19:
                       ElapseTimen[q] --
20:
                  End If
21:
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_n
23: Done
```

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Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (1/3)

Recall that the wildcard "_" designates any value.

Lemma 1

Each correct process p eventually no more receives $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ where q is a faulty process.

Proof. *q* broadcasts finitely many $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ messages before crashing.

Now, each $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ message is relayed at most once by every other processes.

As every sent message is eventually either received or lost, the lemma holds.

```
1: Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
   3:
         While true do
   4:
              broadcast (ALIVE, p, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
   5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
  6:
7:
8:
                  If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                       If r \neq p then
                           If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[r] \leq 0 then Time<sub>p</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                           ElapseTime_p[r] \leftarrow Timer_p[r]
10:
                           Alive<sub>D</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>D</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                           If r = q then broadcast(ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
 12:
                       End If
 13:
                  End If
14:
              Done
15:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                  If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                       Alive_p \leftarrow Alive_p \setminus \{q\}
18:
                  else
19:
                       ElapseTimen[q] - -
20:
                  End If
21:
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_n
23: Done
```
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Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (2/3)

Lemma 2

Let *p* be a correct process. $\exists t_p, K_p, K'_p \in \mathbb{N}$ with $K_p \geq K'_p$ such that after time t_p , each iteration of the "while" loop by *p* lasts a time belonging to $[K'_p, K_p]$.

Proof.

By definition, \exists a time *t* from which each instruction is executed by *p* within a time that is both lower and upper bounded since *p* is eventually synchronous.

Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (2/3)

Lemma 2

Let *p* be a correct process. $\exists t_p, K_p, K'_p \in \mathbb{N}$ with $K_p \geq K'_p$ such that after time t_p , each iteration of the "while" loop by *p* lasts a time belonging to $[K'_p, K_p]$.

Proof.

By definition, \exists a time *t* from which each instruction is executed by *p* within a time that is both lower and upper bounded since *p* is eventually synchronous.

There is a finite number of instructions before the "while" loop. So, in the worst case, the "while" loop begins within bounded time t_p after *t*.

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Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (2/3)

Lemma 2

Let *p* be a correct process. $\exists t_p, K_p, K'_p \in \mathbb{N}$ with $K_p \geq K'_p$ such that after time t_p , each iteration of the "while" loop by *p* lasts a time belonging to $[K'_p, K_p]$.

Proof.

By definition, \exists a time *t* from which each instruction is executed by *p* within a time that is both lower and upper bounded since *p* is eventually synchronous.

There is a finite number of instructions before the "while" loop. So, in the worst case, the "while" loop begins within bounded time t_0 after t.

Similarly, after t_{ρ} , $\exists K_{\rho}, K'_{\rho} \in \mathbb{N}$ with $K'_{\rho} \leq K_{\rho}$ such that each iteration of the "while" loop by ρ lasts a time belonging to $[K'_{\rho}, K_{\rho}]$ since the "while" loop contains a bounded number of instructions and the time to execute any instruction is both lower and upper bounded.

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Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (3/3)

Corollary 1

Every faulty process is eventually forever suspected by every correct process.

Proof. Let q be a faulty process and p be a correct process.

```
1: Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow 0
   2:
          Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
         While true do
   4:
5:
              broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
              For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
  6:
7:
8:
                  If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                        If r \neq p then
                            If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[r] < 0 then Timer<sub>p</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                             ElapseTime_{p}[r] \leftarrow Timer_{p}[r]
10:
                            Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                            If r = q then broadcast (ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
12:
                        End If
 13:
14:
                  End If
              Done
15:
              For all a \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                  If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                       Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \ {q}
18:
                  else
19:
                        ElapseTime<sub>n</sub>[q] - -
20:
                  End If
21:
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V \ Alive<sub>p</sub>
23: Done
```

Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (3/3)

Corollary 1

Every faulty process is eventually forever suspected by every correct process.

Proof. Let q be a faulty process and p be a correct process.

By Lemma 2, there exists a time t_p from which p executes a "while" loop iteration within at most K_p time units.

```
1:
        Alive<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow 0
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
         While true do
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5:
              broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
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7:
8:
                  If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                        If r \neq p then
                            If ElapseTime<sub>n</sub>[r] < 0 then Time<sub>n</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                             ElapseTime_{p}[r] \leftarrow Timer_{p}[r]
10:
                            Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                            If r = q then broadcast\langle ALIVE, r, p \rangle to V \setminus \{p\}
12:
                        End If
13:
14:
                  End If
              Done
15:
              For all a \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                  If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                       Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \ {q}
18:
                   else
19:
                        ElapseTime<sub>n</sub>[q] - -
20:
                  End If
21:
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_p
23:
        Done
```

Eventual Suspicion of Faulty Processes (3/3)

Corollary 1

Every faulty process is eventually forever suspected by every correct process.

Proof. Let q be a faulty process and p be a correct process.

By Lemma 2, there exists a time t_p from which p executes a "while" loop iteration within at most K_p time units.

So, from time t_p , p eventually satisfies *ElapseTime*_p[q] = 0 forever, by Lemma 1.

```
 Alive<sub>p</sub> ← V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> ← Ø

  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
  4:
5:
             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
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7:
8:
                 If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                      If r \neq p then
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  9:
                           ElapseTime_{p}[r] \leftarrow Timer_{p}[r]
10:
                           Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \cup {r}
11:
                           If r = q then broadcast (ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
12:
                      End If
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                 End If
             Done
15:
             For all a \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                 If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                      Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>p</sub> \ {q}
18:
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19:
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                 End If
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             Done
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So, from time t_p , p eventually satisfies *ElapseTime*_p[q] = 0 forever, by Lemma 1.

Hence, q is eventually removed from *Alive*_p forever and so eventually belongs forever to *Suspected*_p.

```
 Alive<sub>p</sub> ← V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> ← Ø

  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
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5:
             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
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10:
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12:
                       End If
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14:
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16:
                 If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                      Alive<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow Alive<sub>n</sub> \setminus {q}
18:
                  else
19:
                       ElapseTime_[g] - -
20:
                 End If
21:
              Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_p
23: Done
```

Cournier & Devismes

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (1/4)

Lemma 3

Let *p* and *q* be two correct processes such that $p \neq q$. There exists $t_p, \Delta_p \in \mathbb{N}$ such that after time t_p, p receives $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ at least every Δ_p time units.

Proof. Let $\diamond b$ be an eventual bi-source.

◇P The Model The Algorithm **The Proof**

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (1/4)

Lemma 3

Let *p* and *q* be two correct processes such that $p \neq q$. There exists $t_p, \Delta_p \in \mathbb{N}$ such that after time t_p, p receives $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ at least every Δ_p time units.

Proof. Let $\diamond b$ be an eventual bi-source.

By Lemma 2 and by definition of eventual bi-source, there exists $t \in \mathbb{N}$ such that after time t,

- *q*, ◊*b*, and *p* respectively execute each "while" loop iteration within at most *K_q*, *K_{◊b}*, and *K_p* time units.
- Moreover, every message sent from or to ◊b is delivered in at most δ₀b time units.

◇P The Model The Algorithm **The Proof**

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (1/4)

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Let *p* and *q* be two correct processes such that $p \neq q$. There exists $t_p, \Delta_p \in \mathbb{N}$ such that after time t_p, p receives $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ at least every Δ_p time units.

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- Moreover, every message sent from or to ◊b is delivered in at most δ₀b time units.

Two cases: $q = \diamond b$ or $q \neq \diamond b$.

P
 The Model

 The Algorithm

 The Proof

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (2/4)

Case $q = \diamond b$

 $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that q starts a "while" loop iteration at time t'. From t', q executes a (full) "while" loop iteration at least every K_q time units. So, q broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from t'.

P
 The Model

 The Algorithm

 The Proof

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (2/4)

Case $q = \diamond b$

 $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that *q* starts a "while" loop iteration at time *t'*. From *t'*, *q* executes a (full) "while" loop iteration at least every K_q time units. So, *q* broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from *t'*.

These messages are delivered to *p* within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units after their sending.

P
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Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (2/4)

Case $q = \diamond b$

 $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that *q* starts a "while" loop iteration at time *t'*. From *t'*, *q* executes a (full) "while" loop iteration at least every K_q time units. So, *q* broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from *t'*.

These messages are delivered to *p* within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units after their sending.

Now, p executes a full "while" loop iteration at least every $2.K_p$ time units.

Hence, with $\Delta_p = K_q + \delta_{\diamond b} + 2.K_p$, the lemma holds in this case.

P
 The Model

 The Algorithm

 The Proof

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (3/4) Case $q \neq \diamond b$

Similarly to the previous case: $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that *q* broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from *t'*.

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (3/4) Case $q \neq \diamond b$

Similarly to the previous case: $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that *q* broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from *t'*.

These messages are delivered to $\diamond b$ within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units after their sending; so at least every $K_a + \delta_{\diamond b}$ time units.

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (3/4) Case $q \neq \diamond b$

Similarly to the previous case: $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that *q* broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from *t'*.

These messages are delivered to $\diamond b$ within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units after their sending; so at least every $K_a + \delta_{\diamond b}$ time units.

 $\diamond b$ sends $\langle ALIVE, q, \diamond b \rangle$ to p at least every $K_q + \delta_{\diamond b} + 2.K_{\diamond b}$ time units.

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (3/4) Case $q \neq \diamond b$

Similarly to the previous case: $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that *q* broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from *t'*.

These messages are delivered to $\diamond b$ within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units after their sending; so at least every $K_a + \delta_{\diamond b}$ time units.

 $\diamond b$ sends $\langle ALIVE, q, \diamond b \rangle$ to *p* at least every $K_q + \delta_{\diamond b} + 2K_{\diamond b}$ time units.

 $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ messages are delivered to *p* at least $K_q + 2.\delta_{\diamond b} + 2.K_{\diamond b}$ time units.

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (3/4) Case $q \neq \diamond b$

Similarly to the previous case: $\exists t' \in [t..t + K_q]$ such that *q* broadcasts $\langle ALIVE, q, q \rangle$ at least every K_q time units from *t'*.

These messages are delivered to $\diamond b$ within at most $\delta_{\diamond b}$ time units after their sending; so at least every $K_a + \delta_{\diamond b}$ time units.

 $\diamond b$ sends $\langle ALIVE, q, \diamond b \rangle$ to *p* at least every $K_q + \delta_{\diamond b} + 2K_{\diamond b}$ time units.

 $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ messages are delivered to *p* at least $K_q + 2.\delta_{\diamond b} + 2.K_{\diamond b}$ time units.

Since *p* executes a full "while" loop iteration at least every 2. K_p time units, by letting $\Delta_p = K_q + 2.\delta_{\diamond b} + 2.K_{\diamond b} + 2.K_p$, the lemma holds in this case.

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (4/4)

Corollary 2

There exists a time from which no correct process is suspected by any correct process.

Proof.

Let p and q be two correct processes.

```
1:
        Alive<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow V; Suspected<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
  4:
             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
  5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
  6:
7:
8:
                 If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                      If r \neq p then
                           If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[r] \leq 0 then Time<sub>p</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                           ElapseTime_{n}[r] \leftarrow Timer_{n}[r]
10:
                           Aliven \leftarrow Aliven \cup {r}
11:
                           If r = q then broadcast(ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
12:
                      End If
13:
                 End If
14:
             Done
15:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
16:
                 If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
17:
                      Aliven \leftarrow Aliven \setminus \{a\}
18:
                  else
19:
                      ElapseTimen[q] --
20:
                 End If
21:
             Done
22:
              Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V \setminus Alive_n
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```

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Proof.

Let p and q be two correct processes.

If p = q, q is never removed from Alivep and so never inserted into Suspected_p. Hence, the lemma holds in this case.

```
1:
        Alive<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V: Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow 0
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
  4:
             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
  5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
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8:
                 If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
                      If r \neq p then
                          If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[r] \leq 0 then Time<sub>p</sub>[r] + +
  9:
                           ElapseTime_{n}[r] \leftarrow Timer_{n}[r]
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                          Aliven \leftarrow Aliven \cup {r}
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Proof.

Let p and q be two correct processes.

- If p = q, q is never removed from Alivep and so never inserted into Suspectedp. Hence, the lemma holds in this case.
- Otherwise, q is regularly inserted into Alivep, by Lemma 3.

```
1:
        Alive<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V: Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
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             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
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             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
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                 If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
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                      Aliven \leftarrow Aliven \setminus \{a\}
18:
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- If p = q, q is never removed from Alivep and so never inserted into Suspectedp. Hence, the lemma holds in this case.
- Otherwise, q is regularly inserted into Alivep, by Lemma 3.

Assume, by contradiction, that q is suspected infinitely often by p.

```
1:
        Alive<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V: Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
  4:
             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
  5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
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  9:
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                      End If
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20:
                 End If
21:
              Done
22:
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```

Unsuspicion of Correct Processes (4/4)

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- Otherwise, q is regularly inserted into Alivep, by Lemma 3.

Assume, by contradiction, that q is suspected infinitely often by p.

Between every removal and insertion of q, $Timer_{p}[q]$ is incremented.

```
1:
        Alive<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V: Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
  4:
             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
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                           ElapseTime_{n}[r] \leftarrow Timer_{n}[r]
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19:
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                 End If
21:
              Done
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```

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Let p and q be two correct processes.

- If p = q, q is never removed from Alivep and so never inserted into Suspected_p. Hence, the lemma holds in this case.
- Otherwise, q is regularly inserted into Alivep, by Lemma 3.

Assume, by contradiction, that q is suspected infinitely often by p.

Between every removal and insertion of q, $Timer_p[q]$ is incremented.

So, the time between two consecutive receptions of $\langle ALIVE, q, _ \rangle$ by *p* regularly increases by Lemma 2, a contradiction to Lemma 3.

```
1:
        Alive<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow V: Suspected<sub>n</sub> \leftarrow \emptyset
  2:
         Timer<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]; ElapseTime<sub>p</sub> \leftarrow [k,...,k]
  3:
        While true do
  4:
             broadcast(ALIVE, p, p) to V \ {p}
  5:
             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
  6:
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8:
                 If receive (ALIVE, r, q) then
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  9:
                           ElapseTime_{n}[r] \leftarrow Timer_{n}[r]
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11:
                           If r = q then broadcast (ALIVE, r, p) to V \setminus \{p\}
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              Done
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             For all q \in V \setminus \{p\} do
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                 If ElapseTime<sub>p</sub>[q] = 0 then
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19:
                      ElapseTimen[q] --
20:
                 End If
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23: Done
```

◇P The Model The Algorithm **The Proof**

Correctness of the Algorithm

By Corollaries 1 and 2, follows.

Theorem 1

Algorithm *EP* is a failure detector of type $\diamond \mathcal{P}$ in System $\mathcal{S}_{\diamond b}$.

Roadmap



- 2 Definition
- 3 Application: a Consensus Algorithm
 - The Model
 - The Algorithm
 - The Proof
- Implementation of a Failure Detector
 - $\diamond P$
 - The Model
 - The Algorithm
 - The Proof





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- [3] M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, and M. Paterson. Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process. *J. ACM*, 32(2):374–382, 1985.